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Abstract   
The globalisation of the software industry is seen to be driven in part by skill 
shortages in industrialised economies, movement of software development practices 
away from centralised to more distributed modes and the spread of information and 
communication technologies to developing countries, where skilled labour is 
available at lower costs.  As such, a software export industry is sometimes seen as a 
means by which some developing countries can create competitive advantage.  While 
many studies have explored the strategies used by some of the more successful 
software-exporting countries, little research has been done in locations that lack some 
of the basic resources deemed necessary for success in this area.  This paper describes 
two Caribbean software-outsourcing ventures in order to explore possible software-
export strategies available within such atypical contexts.  The role of government and 




It has been suggested that increasing global interconnectedness, assisted to a great 
degree by the prevalence of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has 
seen the rise of a new global economic division of labour (Castells 1996).  Certain 
types of work are seen as being relocated to developing countries, thus contributing to 
their economic development (Reich 1991). 
 
One way in which such economic development may be achieved is proposed through 
a framework of “determinants of national competitive advantage” for a country in a 
given industry (Porter 1990). These include: factor conditions (the quality of a 
country‟s human resources and infrastructure needed to support the given industry); 
demand conditions (the strength and vibrancy of the domestic market in that 
particular industry); related and supporting industries (such as suppliers, that are 
themselves internationally competitive); and firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
(domestic competition in the industry and how business is established and organised 
in the country).  The entire system is expected to create a challenging environment for 
firms operating in that industry, forcing innovation and raising standards, which 
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purportedly leads to the development of a superior product that is internationally 
competitive.   
 
The emphasis in Porter‟s diamond is in the creation, by the country, of specialised 
factors of production, with the knowledge to develop and sustain the particular 
industry.  He argues that, overall, government should play a supporting role in 
providing an enabling environment to sustain these four determinants. Even though 
the framework is developed in relation to industrialised countries and those with 
larger economies, Porter (1990) argues that the framework is applicable to any 
country at any level of development.  Furthermore, he categorises developing 
countries as early stage economies positioned generally at the factor-driven stage of 
national competitiveness, a stage dependent upon local resources and unfortunately 
vulnerable to external influences. 
 
The software industry is seen as a particular example of the new economic division of 
labour, driven both by lower costs in developing countries and skill shortages in 
industrialised economies and facilitated by ICTs (Carmel 1999; Herbsleb and Moitra 
2001).  Globalisation of the software industry is thus seen to bring the prospect of 
competitive advantage for developing countries (Kim et al. 1989).  
 
India, the Philippines, Ireland, and Israel, are identified as major centres for such 
offshore software development activity (Lacity and Willcocks 2001).   The most 
notable example of this phenomenon is India, with claims that its software and 
services export industry grew at the rate of 26% in 2002-2003 (estimated to be worth 
$9.87 billion and representing 20.4% of India‟s total exports) and which is thought to 
command 1.9% of the global software market (NASSCOM, 2003). 
 
1.1 India’s Competitive Advantage 
The growth of India‟s software industry has prompted some authors to analyse the 
conditions leading to that success, attributing it, for example, to investment by 
expatriate Indians, the existence of a large, highly educated workforce steeped in a 
tradition of tertiary education, and the innate mathematical abilities of Indians 
(Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam 1997).  Additionally, there are those who 
point to apparent deficiencies in demand and factor conditions, lack of significant 
domestic rivalries in the local software industry, and absence of locally-based 
interrelated and supporting industries, to argue that Porter‟s „Diamond‟ may not 
necessarily apply in the case of the Indian software export industry (Krishna et al. 
2000).  Instead, these authors emphasise cultural context and historical legacies as in 
part responsible for the viability of the industry and propose their own explanatory 
framework meant to capture national determinants of success in the specific area of 
software production.  These determinants, they argue, comprise people, technology, 
communication and organisation, all of which, they claim, Indian society has proved 
quite proficient at developing.  Nonetheless, they also emphasise the need for 
government interventions to ensure that adequate resources are provided for industry 
growth.  India‟s current position as the leading software-exporting developing 
country is seen thus to have been achieved in unique ways that are probably not so 
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easily emulated by others seeking to compete (Krishna et al. 2000; Tessler and Barr 
1997; Heeks 1996). 
 
1.2 Developing Country Strategies for Software-based Economic Development 
Other authors have sought to propose strategies for software-based economic growth 
for developing countries in general.  Of these, most tend to recommend some 
combined strategy of promoting a domestic software market, in order to build local 
expertise and create opportunities for innovation, and also promoting a foreign export 
market in order to build alliances and earn foreign investment (Schware 1992; Correa 
1996; Heeks 1999; Heeks and Nicholson 2002).  One of the suggested frameworks 
analyses the viability of a developing country‟s software export strategy, by assessing 
demand conditions (the existence of markets for the software product), national vision 
and strategy (national policy vis-à-vis the software industry and exports), 
international linkages and trust (making and sustaining ties with overseas customers 
and suppliers), software industry characteristics (nature of competition between firms, 
the clustering of these firms and the ability of these firms to collaborate), and 
domestic input factors/infrastructure (people, the technology, financing, research and 
development and other unspecified intangibles) (Heeks and Nicholson 2002).  The 
authors also promote strategies for late entrants to the market, such as newcomer 
developing countries, which include low cost labour and market niche specialisation.  
The role of government is also explicitly emphasised in six proposed factors that 
support the software industry: people, technology, money, infrastructure, innovation 
and other bureaucratic and logistic areas.  The framework is suggested as a guideline 
for developing countries seeking to benefit from a software-export industry. 
  
2 Research problem and objectives 
The conditions for national competitive advantage and the software export strategies 
discussed in the previous section have been developed and examined within the 
context of India and other developing countries with fairly large software export 
industries or with resources capable of providing the potential for such growth, so-
called „second-tier‟ countries (Heeks and Nicholson 2002).  These guidelines, 
however, would appear to offer little for countries that lack many of these basic 
resources/infrastructure. In order to address this apparent imbalance, this paper will 
describe two cases of software outsourcing to the Caribbean, a region not traditionally 
recognised for software production and lacking many of the factors identified by 
Krishna et al. (2000) and Heeks and Nicholson (2002).  In this way, the paper will 
explore what strategies may be available within such contexts for developing a viable 
software export industry and how they compare with those discussed in the previous 
section.   
 
3 Research design and methods 
The data were gathered from published materials and semi-structured interviews with 
employees and outsourcing practitioners knowledgeable of the Caribbean context.  
These latter were conducted through e-mail, by telephone and face-to-face, typically 
of forty-five minutes in duration.  Some of the sources are anonymised to protect their 
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identities.  Primary data sources were mainly chosen due to the under-researched 
nature of the Caribbean software industry.  The data were analysed using NUD*IST® 
to extract relevant themes.   
 
4 Results 
Two cases of software outsourcing companies operating in the Caribbean will be 
presented in this section, both of which claimed to be practising nearshore software 
outsourcing (Abbott and Jones 2003), albeit in slightly differing ways.  Nearshore 
software outsourcing is assumed to be the practice of offshore outsourcing from 
venues geographically closer to the client.  The term is mentioned in various contexts, 
particularly with respect to the US from Mexico (e.g. Lapper and Tricks 1999) or the 
Caribbean (Carmel and Agarwal 2001).  In the case of both ventures, one of the main 
reasons for choosing the venue was given as the proximity of the island to the US 
market, where the majority of the clients were located. 
 
4.1 PRTB and Nearshore Outsourcing in Barbados 
PRT (Barbados) Ltd. (PRTB), a so-called software engineering centre, was a 
subsidiary of PRT Group Inc., a US-based information technology solutions 
integrator.  In 1994, Doug Mellinger, then the CEO of PRT, identified Barbados as a 
potential site for an offshore development centre. Contemporary reports described the 
PRTB concept:   
“On an island in the Caribbean…, Mellinger has imported the workers, the 
customers, the capital, the infrastructure. He's established a partnership with the 
island itself that suggests how a tiny developing nation can leapfrog right over the 
industrial stage of economic evolution into a global, technology-based, knowledge-
driven future” (Hopkins 1998). 
 
Among the factors influencing the decision to locate in Barbados were a liberal 
government policy on work permits, a favourable wage structure, a low tax rate, a 
modern telecommunications infrastructure, an English-speaking population, and 
convenient access to the US (PRT, 1997).  PRTB operated as an International 
Business Company (IBC) in Barbados and therefore was eligible for certain 
government incentives such as exemption from import duties and repatriation of 
revenues earned.  PRT‟s targeted customers were Fortune 1000 companies in the 
financial services, banking and insurance sectors among others and their portfolio 
included clients such as J.P. Morgan & Co., Guy Carpenter, Travellers Insurance and 
Prudential Insurance (PRT, 1999). 
 
Due to a shortage of sufficiently trained software engineers in Barbados, PRTB 
recruited expatriates from various countries including India. PRTB‟s President, 
Srinivisan Viswanathan explained their hiring strategy as “import[ing] brain power 
from other parts of the world to help Barbados develop that talent internally”.  By 
1999, approximately two-thirds of the staff were expatriates, most notably from India 
(King 1999).  
  
Working with the Barbadian government, PRTB also proposed to provide: “training, 
internships and jobs to Barbadian computer science students” and to “develop an 
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islandwide curriculum for elementary and secondary schools” (King 1999).  PRTB 
was expected to provide the impetus needed for jumpstarting the Barbadian software 
industry by helping to provide new infrastructure, jobs for ancillary services, and 
encouragement for other IT investors (Hopkins 1998).  The vision was shared by a 
number of PRT‟s customers, who supported the project with contributions, such as 
advance payment for future work, donated design help and construction management 
expertise, to the value of $12 million (Hopkins 1998).  
 
PRTB at first proved to be very successful, growing rapidly to 350 staff, by 1998.  At 
PRT Group‟s initial public offering, in 1997, share prices were at $13.00 per share 
and rose quickly to a high of about $21.00 per share.   The company promoted its 
“Computer Software Engineering Centres” and onshore/offshore/nearshore approach, 
as a significant contributor to its success (PRT, 1997). 
 
During 1998 and 1999, however, PRTB‟s profits fell sharply and staff attrition 
became a problem, with numbers falling to 80 members by June 1999.  The loss of 
revenue from the Barbados subsidiary affected the Group‟s share price which fell to 
about $3.00 by mid 1999.  PRTB‟s losses were attributed to employee attrition, 
excessively quick growth and difficulty selling Barbados as a destination for software 
development: 
“Complicating the sales challenge further, "the work in Barbados meant selling 
custom-solutions projects, not [programmer] bodies," says Mark Prieto, a J. P. 
Morgan vice-president who was lent to PRT throughout the build-out of Barbados. 
"Instead of asking, 'How many programmers do you need? When do you want them 
to start?' " says Viswanathan, salespeople needed to understand a client's business 
well enough to help solve its problems” (Hopkins 1999). 
 
Interviews with nearshore practitioners, familiar with doing business in Barbados, and 
with the PRT undertaking, confirmed the press reports.  One such interviewee 
commented that expatriate employment might have been unavoidable: 
“Such countries, like Barbados, do not often have the calibre of software 
professionals that are required, hence, staff relocations are required and that means 
recruiting from „other‟ countries.”  
 
PRTB‟s approach to realising the nearshore concept also came in for criticism with 
claims that appropriate marketing strategies had not been utilised.  As interviewees 
explained, a special market focus may have been needed to promote small islands, 
such as the Caribbean states, as software exporters: 
“Determine what type of projects it makes more sense to do ...  Production support is 
do-able due to the time zone advantage as opposed to India‟s time zone.  
Connectivity problems exist in India.  Better to do this type of work in Barbados.” 
 
Also, PRTB might have been better off to have invested more in developing the local 
workforce:   
“The success[ful] implementation of an IT school in Barbados operated… in 
conjunction with the Barbadian Government and UWI, in 2-3 years, [would] „create 
and nurture‟ the type of employees [that were] needed.  …this was the answer.” 
 
It was also noted that, under Barbados legislation, IBC‟s, such as PRTB, were not 
allowed to trade on the local market so as to protect the local software industry, but 
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interviewees felt that a more liberal government policy might have been 
advantageous.  As one interviewee put it: 
“An incorrect government policy can limit advantages – in such a business you are 
getting higher technology experience for clients in more advanced countries – 
however, …government policy is that this expertise is not allowed to be used to 
service local clients...  In case of Barbados, for most of the near-shore development 
there is a total ban on local business.  A more prudent country policy would be to 
allow at least say 25% of the revenue to be sourced from local business.” 
 
  The government‟s involvement, however, was seen to be restricted mainly to 
providing an enabling environment: 
“…the infrastructure must be good and the tariffs affordable.  Government policy 
should be stable. [The operation is] dependent on expatriate expert man-power.  
[What] should be conducive to getting and retaining that personnel, [are] both 
government and business environment”. 
 
4.2 Indusa Global, a Jamaican Nearshore Enterprise 
Indusa Global was established in 1995 by James Ram, an Indian expatriate living in 
the USA, in collaboration with US entrepreneur Carroll Rushing, with the aim of 
establishing a software development presence in the Caribbean to exploit its 
proximity to the USA and gain competitive advantage, by providing a “near shore 
alternative to offshore programming”. Officials from a Jamaican government agency, 
the Montego Bay Free Zone, aware of Indusa‟s interest, approached the entrepreneurs 
with the possibility of making that investment in Jamaica.  The island was eventually 
chosen because in addition to its proximity, it possessed a cheap, educated workforce 
of native English speakers and a functional telecommunications infrastructure.   
 
  Ram summarised Indusa‟s strategy: 
“…we felt that the way to build [the company] would be to establish a training 
program, develop our own workforce and then use them to build the company.  
…we thought the government would become a bigger partner if they saw us training 
their people and keeping them on for the long haul.” (James Ram, CEO Indusa)    
 
This would be facilitated initially by Indian expatriates: 
“The business model had it that we would bring in Indians that had been trained in 
India, move them to Jamaica, create an offshore business, and use the Indians as the 
mentors for the students when they graduated …to incubate them and improve their 
skills so that they would be competitive on the world-wide market” (Caroll Rushing, 
Chairman of Indusa) 
 
A training school, the Caribbean Institute of Technology (CIT), was therefore 
established in collaboration with the government of Jamaica (in the form of the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Communications and the Ministry of Education, 
through the national training agency, HEART) and Jamaican, US and UK academic 
institutions (University of the West Indies, Jamaica, University of Technology, 
Jamaica, Furman University, South Carolina and University of Hertfordshire, UK).  
The curriculum, was developed by the academic partners and was closely tied to 
Indusa‟s needs, focusing on the latest technological areas, such as web and Java 
programming.  Applicants to the program were to possess at least a high-school 
education, but beyond that no computer literacy was mandated.  As a result persons 
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from all occupations and backgrounds were accepted into the program.  The ten-
month course was expected to bring the complete novice up to the standard of 
computer programmer.  The “incubation” process would then be initiated on these 
graduates.  Indusa Global hired all of graduates of the first year and a significant 
percentage of the second group. 
   
Indusa Global provided the start-up money for the project and with Furman 
University continues to hold the controlling interest.  The Jamaican governmental 
bodies provided support through infrastructure, operating costs and financing for the 
trainees.  The academic partners still provide guidance in crafting the curriculum and 
assuring quality standards are kept. Although in general the participants in this joint 
venture worked well together, some differences were noted, for example, some 
government departments were initially sceptical about the project because of bad 
experiences with similar ventures in the past.  Additionally, there were conflicts 
between government departments as to who would assume control of the operation, 
and between the academic institutions as to the nature of the curriculum and accorded 
status of the teaching institution.  Conflicts of interest between the objectives of 
quasi-public „not for profit‟ organisations and privately funded profit-motivated firms 
also had to be overcome. 
   
Once the project was approved, however, the government championed the effort 
through the Minister of Trade, Industry and Communications, Phillip Paulwell, who 
gave it his personal endorsement and attention.  Further differences arose however, 
about plans for expansion of CIT, with Indusa and the university partners, concerned 
that the quality of tuition might be compromised, being more cautious and the 
government seeking to establish the scheme on a more island-wide basis, reflecting 
their desire to expand IT employment, not just in programming, but also in 
telemarketing and call centres, in an effort to diversify away from a dependency on a 
vulnerable tourism industry. 
   
Despite these tensions, however, the collaboration has endured.  Interviewees 
attributed this to the commitment shown by the partners, both the government‟s high 
level of involvement in sponsoring and funding the project, and Indusa‟s follow-
through in hiring the trained programmers even if “their utilization factor for external 
revenue was 50% or below”.  Other contributing factors were the presence of senior 
representatives of the partnership on the managing board of the CIT and the 
chairmanship of that board by the government training agency HEART.  One aspect 
that seemed to help was a common vision shared by the public and private partners 
that this project gave “the opportunity for an industry to develop to help [the 
Jamaican] economy”, a view embraced by a government pursuing the path towards 
diversification of the economy by “get[ting] our brighter Jamaicans to upscale into 
programming”.  The need to involve local Jamaicans in the process of training and in 
improving their skills base through local projects was also mentioned among issues to 
be addressed in moving forward:   
“And it‟s imperative that their government bring in incubator programmes where the 
Jamaicans and companies like Indusa Global are afforded some set-aside work, 
making sure that the industry can build a reputation and a core competence over 
time.”(Carroll Rushing, Chairman, Indusa Global) 
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Indusa‟s overseas clients include Computer Sciences Corporation, Applianceware, 
and the Ritz Carlton (INDUSA 2002) and it has initiated „partnering‟ schemes with at 
least two of its customers, who have pledged to help sell the „nearshore‟ option. The 
company also has contracts with Caribbean and Jamaican ventures, including 
Jamaican government agencies, demonstrating the level of trust that has been 
achieved in that arrangement.  An Indusa Director described their strategy toward 
acquiring customers: 
“Unless you have a substantial marketing capability, I think the idea will not take 
off.  Also in the initial years, I think, you may or may not be able to retain all your 
clients.  So you need to continually find a large basket of customers, …finding 
different type of, or a wide variety of customers not just a particular type of 
customer” 
 
Indusa‟s executive also complained about the “No problem, Mon” image of the 
Caribbean islands that made it difficult to convince potential clients to risk doing 
business there.  Initially, as a means of overcoming this obstacle, the company 
presented an American appearance to its customers: 
“Initially, when we started Indusa, selling the Jamaican programmers was not going 
to work.  One of the things we did was to bring in our management from the key 
larger US companies.  …So some of the folks that we brought into Jamaica, from 
the US made a huge difference in our credibility factor.” 
 
In some instances, this “foreign” image still remains although many of Indusa‟s 
employees are local Jamaicans.  As one local client put it: 
“Well, the people that interfaced with me, I believe, are not Jamaican, so…I would 
refer to the company as in fact a foreign-based company.  In terms of local talent, 
the talent out of CIT, they are not matured enough yet.  They can be used as a team, 
but certainly they could not lead a team of this nature.”  
 
At the time of the study, numbers of staff had risen from an initial 15 to close to 100, 
83 of whom were CIT graduates.  Indian workers comprised approximately 10% of 
Indusa‟s total workforce then, and were primarily employed in senior positions.  
Estimated revenues for 2002 were forecast at US$ 3 million.     
 
5 Discussion 
The size of the IT sector in the Caribbean is difficult to ascertain, however one report 
estimates that it generates more than $200 million for the region, employing some 
5,000 people of which 36% are located in Jamaica and 41% in Barbados.  Of these, 
10% work directly with software development (Global Information Network 1999).  
For comparison, the overall population of Barbados is estimated at 277,264 and of 
Jamaica at 2,695,867 (CIA World FactBook 2003).   
 
The Caribbean has a varied history, having been settled by the British, French, 
Spanish and Dutch at various points of their history (Williams 1970).  As a result, 
most of the islands tend to retain much of their colonial history depending on where 
the settlers originated.  In the former British colonies, for example, English is the 
official language spoken and educational and political systems tend to follow closely 
British standards as they existed in the mid 20th century, when these islands first 
gained political autonomy.   
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The cultural influences originate from the variety of people that have populated these 
countries and therefore comprise a mixture of African, Indian, European and some 
indigenous roots.  Hence, the reggae music industry, which is indigenous to Jamaica 
and calypso, which started in Trinidad have their roots in African rhythms while the 
carnival tradition practiced in most islands is influenced by European and African 
cultural traditions (Horowitz 1971).  The islands first became prized possessions of 
the respective European occupiers in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries due to the 
prosperity of the locally grown tobacco and sugar crops.  With the demise of both of 
these industries, tourism has risen to prominence as a major foreign exchange earner 
for these islands. 
 
Given this background information, it is clear that the availability of trained IT 
resources and supporting industries in these islands is fairly limited.  Thus one can 
argue like Krishna et al. (2000), that Porter‟s “Diamond” may not be applicable in 
this context.  Similarly, one can also argue, contrary to Krishna et al.‟s (2000) case 
for India‟s competitive advantage, that the islands lack that cultural and historical 
heritage that might be expected to lead to success in software development.  Both of 
the case study companies, moreover, are quite small (about 100 employees each, at 
the time of the study), and thus not internationally significant, when compared with 
multinational competitors.  The degree of their impact on the local economies, 
nevertheless, may be substantial. 
   
An analysis of the strategies used by these two companies to overcome the islands‟ 
apparent intrinsic deficiencies, may therefore provide insights as to what approaches 
may succeed in such non-traditional contexts.  The analysis looks broadly at their 
strengths and weaknesses in six areas, viz. staffing, financing, clientele, marketing 
government support and integration into the local environment. 
 
5.1 Staffing 
Although PRT‟s stated objective was to train local staff, in practice most were 
eventually recruited from abroad.  While this addressed the resource and skill 
deficiencies that might have otherwise halted the company‟s quick progress, it 
appears to have been short-lived.  When staff attrition reached high levels in 1999, 
there was no opportunity to address this by resorting to local resources. 
 
Indusa Global, on the other hand, adopted a more gradualist strategy of bringing in 
some expatriate Indians, training the locals and then building the company.  In about 
five years, Indusa has only grown to about 100 persons and continues a steady, albeit 
slow, growth.  Most of those employees are local Jamaicans.  Although this approach 
may eventually be more sustainable, it does require a significant initial investment in 
training those human resources, a big risk if it proves unworkable.  
 
5.2 Financing 
PRT was financed initially through private capital and investments from prospective 
clients.  After the IPO in 1997, its sources expanded to include funds from general 
10 
investors, but its responsibilities toward its shareholders also became of paramount 
importance.  The pressure on the company to post profits and its apparent failure to 
maintain its sales stream have been noted as contributors to its financial problems 
(Hopkins, 1999).  The company‟s initial sources of capital, however, may have aided 
its quick growth, since essentially PRTB provided dedicated programming expertise 
to its client shareholders, a situation that may have been sustainable if the volume of 
incoming work had been consistent. 
 
Indusa was mainly financed through private capital, while the CIT was funded partly 
by the government of Jamaica and its representatives and partly by Indusa.  Using this 
approach, Indusa was able to involve the government from the beginning with its 
plans and to secure with them a working partnership in establishing the CIT.  The 
government‟s financial stake in the operation increases the commitment it has to 
making the entire operation viable.  The disadvantage of this relationship clearly lies 
in maintaining this partnership and balancing the objectives of the participants. 
 
5.3 Clientele 
PRT focused on US Fortune 1000 companies.  This appears at first sight to have been 
a wise tactic, given that such companies tend to have large IT budgets and that having 
blue-chip customers would also enhance the company‟s prospects for further 
investment.  It seemed, however, in the long run to have set up a dependence on these 
external clients to keep the company viable.  The loss of a revenue stream from any 
of these clients would therefore have been significant.  This dependence may have led 
to their eventual problems, since failure to attract new clients was cited as a possible 
reason for their financial difficulties. 
  
Unlike PRTB, Indusa‟s special relationship with the Jamaican government allowed it 
to target local and Caribbean customers as well as external US clients.  This strategy 
allowed Indusa some degree of independence from the variations in the US demand 
for software services as well as a way of developing local expertise and possible 
niche market areas, strategies promoted in the literature (Heeks 1999; Schware 1992).  
Naturally such small economies as Jamaica cannot totally escape some dominance 
from the larger US market, given its proximity and its reputation as one the largest 
global software markets, hence at some level dependence on the US market for the 
bulk of its operation would still exist for Indusa. 
 
5.4 Marketing 
PRTB was seen to have failed to differentiate itself sufficiently from other more well-
known alternatives to nearshore software outsourcing, like India, relying instead on 
patterns of offshore outsourcing that had worked for the parent company such as 
“body-shopping”.  In retrospect, it seemed that nearshore might have required a 
different more focused marketing emphasis, such as that proposed by its practitioners.  
Nevertheless, in attempting to sell a new concept, reliance on more familiar modes of 
operation may have assisted the company at its inception. 
 
11 
In response to this challenge, Indusa initially concentrated on its image and recruited 
senior staff from reputed American companies, and its programming staff from India.  
Other strategies pursued by Indusa were to develop a large and varied customer base 
in various industries and to initiate partnering schemes with customers, who would 
commit to actively helping to sell the nearshore concept to external clients.  The 
initial recruitment tactic and the customer strategies could be seen as a means to 
increase credibility and spread risk, which appeared, at least in the short term, to 
provide enough work to sustain the enterprise.  Selling nearshore, however, still 
remains a risky affair, as it is seen to be a new, untested concept (Abbott and Jones 
2003). 
 
5.5 Government Support 
Government support in the case of PRTB seems to have been fairly passive.  Besides 
affording logistics support, the government appeared not to play a proactive role in 
PRTB‟s establishment.  Instead, it seemed that PRTB was expected to build 
infrastructure, attract clients and provide employment.  Although this approach 
enabled PRTB to make progress unimpeded by government bureaucracy, the 
expectations raised at their initial arrival on the island were hardly met.  Providing 
viable investment opportunities for software exporting companies such as PRTB is 
thought to be an important government strategy (Kim et al. 1989), however, further 
roles may need to be identified to make those investments last in such small 
economies. 
 
With Indusa, it appears that the Jamaican government actively courted the owners to 
invest in Jamaica, and eventually gave full political and some economic support for 
the project.  Thus, as Heeks and Nicholson (2002) and Lipsey (1997) have 
recommended, the government‟s proactive role and continued involvement, through 
CIT, seemed to have contributed to Indusa‟s initial success as an offshore software 
outsourcing entity.  Although the school was initially built to train Indusa‟s 
employees, its existence could continue to provide resources for attracting other 
investors.  The degree of closeness of that interaction and the degree of commitment, 
however, may have to be negotiated in order to maximise mutual benefits reflecting 
the different parties‟ distinct priorities.  Finding a balance between these may be 
critical to long-term success (Abernethy and Reichgelt 2001). 
 
5.6 Integration into Local Environment 
PRT, through its expatriate recruitment strategy and dependence on external clientele 
does not seem to have been particularly integrated into the local environment.  
Besides the salaries earned by the local Barbadians working there and the profits 
gained by those involved in providing ancillary services, not much would have been 
generated for the local economy.  This type of activity is referred to as creating 
“export enclaves” where the local environment does not benefit much from the 
activities of software exporting companies (Heeks 1999).  This external focus was not 
stated as part of their original objectives for the enterprise, but seemed to have 
evolved as a means of survival.  For example, the company needed to support its 
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growing expansion and thus could not solely rely on resources within Barbados to do 
so. 
 
Indusa appears to have both an external focus and an internal presence through its 
strategies of having an incubation and image-building period and then involving 
government and educational institutions, tying its success to their active involvement 
in that collaboration.  Indusa‟s capacity for employing CIT graduates, unfortunately, 
depends on the state of its major market, the US.  The CIT operates, however, more 
and more as a Jamaican entity and can thus continue to provide a means by which the 
local population can obtain marketable skills, and the ability to generate income 
independent of Indusa.  Providing the skills for building Jamaica‟s local IT capability 
is therefore an intangible asset that the Indusa scheme offers, and which according to 
the literature can help the country promote its software export strategy (Schware 
1992; Heeks 1999).  Nonetheless despite its attempts at local assimilation, Indusa was 
still viewed locally as a foreign entity and its Jamaican programmers as not having 
that much credibility. 
 
5.7 Assessing the Outsourcers’ Strategies 
Most of the frameworks reviewed mention human resources as an important aspect of 
the process of developing a viable software export industry (Heeks and Nicholson 
2002; Krishna et al. 2000; Porter 1990), although in the cases assessed by these 
frameworks, lack of sufficient trained resources was not raised as an issue.  In the 
case of the Caribbean islands, it was a major issue to be overcome, which led to the 
approaches used.  The same sort of deficiency can probably be expected of any other 
small developing region attempting to use software export to their economic 
advantage.  Of the two strategies, the one that seems to have some sustainable 
potential is the Indusa approach of training the local population.  Those frameworks 
that promote developing a homegrown software business also stress the need for 
developing indigenous talent, thus suggesting that the Indusa approach may have 
support within the literature.   
 
Financing is mentioned in the frameworks in connection with government policies 
such as allowing tax breaks and lifting import restrictions so as to ensure that 
software exporters can be profitable (Heeks and Nicholson 2002; Kim et al. 1989).  In 
both the cases reviewed, government‟s policies were in line with these suggested 
positions.  Both companies were, however, foreign to the islands and thus secured 
their financing externally.  Obtaining foreign equity in such a manner was seen as 
part of India‟s externally focused “export-oriented” development strategy (Schware 
1992).  Of the two cases, it appeared that the less externally focused strategy, the 
Indusa approach, which collaborated with local financiers, had the potential staying 
power. 
 
Building close client relationships that foster trust and international linkages was seen 
in at least one framework to be an efficient aspect of a software-export strategy 
(Heeks and Nicholson 2002).  Both PRTB and Indusa had such linkages and close 
client relationships, however, it appeared that the degree of dependency was less in 
the latter case, thus allowing them perhaps more independence and leverage.  Such 
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strategies might be especially beneficial for smaller countries that, in general, do not 
already possess strong trade or communication links with more industrialised nations. 
 
With regard to marketing, promoting specific areas of expertise or “niches” is 
mentioned in some of the literature as a viable export strategy especially for 
newcomers to the industry or, perhaps as in this case, smaller countries with less 
resources and smaller economies (Heeks and Nicholson 2002; Heeks 1999; Correa 
1996).  Interviews with the nearshore outsourcers revealed that this was a desired, if 
not sometimes applied strategy. 
 
Practically all of the frameworks mentioned to some degree government‟s role in 
supporting software export especially in small developing countries.  Perhaps the 
most comprehensive of these is (Heeks and Nicholson 2002) where governments are 
expected to take active control of the direction of the software export industry in the 
developing country.  In the cases reviewed, it was seen that the greater commitment 
on the part of government was realised with their active involvement, financially and 
politically in the establishment of the Indusa/CIT enterprise.  Their support and on-
going involvement would be secured due to their stake in the success of failure of the 
project. 
 
Although not mentioned specifically in any of the frameworks, the outsourcing 
company‟s level of integration within the society appears also to have some influence 
on the sustainability of the project and is evident as an underlying aspect of the 
previously discussed approaches.  It appears that the more integrated with the local 
milieu is the scheme adopted by the outsourcer, the more is its potential for 
succeeding.  Perhaps the framework that most closely approaches this idea is the 
software development system diamond (Krishna et al. 2000) where cultural aspects 
affecting the success of software exporting are highlighted and it is argued that traits 
indigenous to the country had more effect on its success as a software exporter than 
economic aspects such as Porter‟s determinants.  Likewise, the “soft” aspects of 
Indusa‟s approach and PRTB‟s original ideas of helping the community to develop its 
own IT capability seemed to be productive and sustainable ideas, which perhaps are 
useful within communities such as this which more often lack other substantial 
resources to help achieve sustainability.  These ideas perhaps adhere more closely to 
notions developed in other areas of IS research concerned with cultural adaptation of 
IT in developing countries (Walsham 2001; Westrup et al. 2000).  These authors 
emphasise adaptation and compromise on the parts of both those bringing the foreign 
technology into the country and those expecting to benefit from it.  Assimilating into 
the local context and demonstrating long term commitment on the part of the foreign 
entity and appropriating and adapting the technology on the part of the local 
community are the types of approaches promoted. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The findings discussed above may therefore have implications for the implementation 
of strategies for software export in developing countries, especially where significant 
factors considered as precursors to success are absent.  This suggests that pre-existing 
frameworks may need to be tailored for such contexts in order to make them viable. 
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The results presented here, however, are preliminary and subject to limitations in the 
scope of the study.  Their generalisability is therefore constrained.  Nearshore 
software outsourcing ventures in the Caribbean, for example, appear to be somewhat 
based on opportunistic initiatives instigated by external entities rather than a 
concerted strategy by private or public sector, hence, studying these enterprises is 
limited to the small samples that are available.  The companies researched were also 
attempting to sell a new concept in an untested environment, the so-called „nearshore 
software outsourcing‟ option, (Abbott and Jones 2003) which may account for the 
strategies that were adopted.  In the absence of the existence of a larger sample these 
companies, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to common patterns of success 
among them and the possible reasons.  Also other factors, intrinsic to the islands 
themselves, (small size, dependence on a specific industry) may have led to the 
choice of certain strategies and their eventual outcome.  There may still be 
significance, however, in the fact that both cases exhibited consistent themes. 
 
It has been noted that, due to an increasingly networked economy, brought on by the 
spread of ICTs and the forces of globalisation small states may suffer marginalisation 
(Castells 1996).  By becoming part of a globalised software industry, these states may 
stand a chance of being included in international trading links. Similarly, places not 
usually associated with IT work may become important bases for software 
production, given the continuing growing demand for software and the skill shortages 
worldwide.  In this paper, the proximity of these particular places was seen as a 
strategic benefit.  In the future, other non-traditional areas may be chosen on the basis 
of other considerations such as political stability or security assurances.  Hence, a 
better understanding of viable approaches to be used in such contexts would be very 
useful to both governments and investors alike.  Not only would these results be 
applicable to such small island developing states, as have been discussed here, but 
perhaps also to underdeveloped areas of both developed or developing countries such 
as non-urban centres or depressed economic regions.  Similar strategies for 
development through software production could be seen to be pertinent.  
 
Further research on software-exporting strategies in such non-traditional contexts is 
clearly necessary in order to determine if the sorts of preliminary observations given 
in the paper can affect approaches to this industry.  In the Caribbean context, 
longitudinal case studies of software exporters can be carried out, that can look at 
trends over time, with respect to changes in government policy and company 
strategies and their effects, the development and progress of the relationship between 
government and these companies and the level of impact of the industry on the 
economy and society in order to develop a better picture of approaches that work.  
Such studies would either reveal inconsistencies in, or provide support for, the current 
observations.  In other non-traditional contexts, a similar approach can be taken.  
Comparisons of the trends observed over time to policies and strategies in place in 
existing software-exporting countries could also be undertaken to ascertain what, if 
any, modification to current suggested frameworks, is advisable.  Research of this 
type is also applicable, in a more general way, to studies on the effects of global 
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